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A B S T R A C T
Ukraine has one of Europe’s fastest growing HIV rates and in 2003–2012 was one of the
largest recipients of funding from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
(GF). Doctoral research recently completed by the author investigates the conduct and prac-
tice of international and national nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) as Principal
Recipients (PRs) of GF grants in Ukraine from 2003 to 2012. An ethnographic enquiry in-
cluding 50 participant interviews was conducted in three oblasts in Ukraine, and in its capital,
Kyiv. The paper presents some of the ﬁndings that emerged from the analysis. Discussing
the PR NGOs roles and practices in delivering HIV prevention programmes funded by GF,
the author argues that the anticipated beneﬁts of NGO partnerships between PR NGOs and
their Sub-Recipients (SRs) have not been achieved. Rather, PRs acted as donors and ran highly
discretionary policies in channelling GF funding to SRs that installed competition and ver-
tical relations between NGO-grantors and NGO-grantees. The outcome was a servile civil
society that is dependent on external funding and is unable to genuinely represent their
communities. With an anticipated GF phasing out from Ukraine, there is a critical lack of
advocacy potential of the civil society to articulate and defend the needs of PLHIV when
transferring HIV services into state funding.
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“We ourselves have nurtured a dragon…. we ourselves
have fallen into inferior position, we turned from leaders
– the Third sector – to (perform) functions of service
personnel”.
Anonymous respondent, Ukraine
1. Background
A focus on civil society is an important principle of the
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GF)1
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1 The following abbreviations are used in the paper:AIDS – acquired im-
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– Eastern Europe and Central AsiaGFATM – the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and MalariaGF – same as aboveGONGO – government-
organised NGOHIV – human immunodeﬁciency virusIDUs – injecting drug
usersINGO – international nongovernmental organisationMARP – most-
at-risk populationM&E – monitoring and evaluationMOH – Ministry of
HealthMSM – men having sex with menNGO – nongovernmental
organisationOIG – Oﬃce of the Inspector General of the GFPLHIV – people
living with HIVPR – principal recipient of GF fundingPWIDs – people who
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– the “main international health donor” (GFATM 2001). As
a requirement for countries’ eligibility to receive funding,
the GF puts a condition to engage civil society and those
affected by the diseases in service provision (Rivers, 2005).
The engagement of NGOs is predicated on the special nature
of GF programmes, which perceive them as having better
access tomarginalised and vulnerable groups such aswomen
and girls, men who have sex with men, transgenders, sex
workers, and people who inject drugs, in comparison with
slow and bureaucratised processes in state health care.
Ukraine had developed the most severe epidemic in
EECA (Kruglov et al., 2008) and was one of the largest
recipients of GF funding. In 2003, it received its ﬁrst R1
HIV grant of 99.12 million USD to implement a govern-
ment health care-centred programme. The Principal
Recipients (PRs) were the Ministry of Health (70% of the
grant), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
(10% of the grant), and the ‘Ukrainian Fund against HIV/
AIDS’, a “GONGO reporting to the Cabinet of Ministers”
(Brusati, 2003, p. 14), responsible for 20% of the grant.
Implementation stalled soon after it started due to lack of
capacity to absorb massive GF funding. In January 2004,
the GF suspended the funding and transferred R1 grant to
an international NGO, ‘International HIV/AIDS Alliance’, a
charity registered in the UK. An anticipated outcome of
the GF decision was a robust and effective delivery of HIV
services. This expectation was rooted in the GF’s percep-
tion of civil society organisations as “essential, successful
and high-performing implementers of Global Fund grants
and that direct ﬁnancing to civil society PRs can improve
the speed of ﬁnance and add additional capacity” (GFATM,
2007). The perceived strength of NGO partnership relation-
ships’ among the Alliance and other NGOs was considered
“key to the success of the GF programme” (Drew, 2005, p.
5). The next R6 grant (2007–2012) continued with its
local NGO subsidiary, Alliance-Ukraine, and a national
NGO ‘All-Ukrainian Network of PLHIV’ (Network) as the
second PR. GF Inspector General noted that lack of nation-
al ownership with minimal government support carried a
risk of the GF programme being a ‘stand-alone’ project
(OIG, 2008).
This paper draws on the evidence that was obtained in
the course of a doctoral research conducted by the author
on the GF programmes in Ukraine (McGill, 2015). The study
investigated the conduct and practices of two PR NGOs as
implementers of GF programme, originally geared at state
health care system. The study situated analysis of NGOs de-
livering HIV services into a broader socio-political context
of ‘Third Sector’ in Ukraine, which has been largely sup-
ported through external funding. The study was informed
by the author’s ﬁrst-hand experience with civil society in
EECA where she closely witnessed as well as participated
in NGO development, and later worked in aid programmes
on HIV/AIDS. The present paper brings in new, country-
speciﬁc evidence, conﬁrming and expanding the existing
views on developed countries’ NGOs acting as donors in aid
programmes.
2. The NGO roles in aid programmes – Literature
review
The point of departure for the analysis of NGO rela-
tions during the GF implementation was determined on the
basis of literature sources on the roles of NGOs in devel-
opment. Important assumptions in literature included the
following:
- Following Ibrahim and Hulme (2010), NGOs typically ex-
ercise three primary roles, namely: advocacy, policy change
and service delivery.
- Rich-country NGOs operate as donors with respect to NGOs
and even to the state in poor countries.
2.1. Dilemmas of external NGOs
Much of the global discourse on AIDS and NGOs is ac-
knowledged as having developed along the lines of a ‘North–
South‘ relationship (Boone & Batsell, 2001). Nelson suggested
a ‘North–South divide’ across NGOs, corresponding roughly
to developed versus less developed countries (Nelson, 2002).
Engberg-Pedersen (2008) argued that development NGOs
in rich countries have been operating as donor agencies with
respect to CSOs and even to state in poor countries: “They
have unilaterally decided where, with whom and regard-
ingwhat theywant towork”, while “the concernwith raising
money and the various ideological commitments have
pushed them towards service delivery” (Engberg-Pedersen,
2008, p. 1). Shumate, Fulk, and Monge (2005, p. 488) de-
scribed the 1990s as “an era of great success for HIV–AIDS
INGOs”, manifested in increased aid funding. They identi-
ﬁed exchange of ideas, promotion of member interests,
coordination and regulation of member activities, educa-
tion and public awareness, research and information
gathering, and humanitarian activities among the INGO ac-
tivities and suggested that INGOs typically work “within the
‘status quo’” to provide services and to advocate for their
members (Shumate et al., 2005, p. 486). Risse (2006) noted
frequent accusations of INGOs for lacking legitimacy and
suggested that the issue was linked to INGOs’ internal ac-
countability: “if we compare ‘INGOs’ to democratic states,
they certainly lack internal accountability” (Risse, 2006, p.
190). Smith, Pagnucco, and Lopez (1998) noted that most
transnationally operating NGOswere accountable to a rather
small group of members and to those who fund them,
mostly private foundations, or public agencies.
2.2. The duality of service delivery and advocacy roles of
NGOs
Ibrahim and Hulme (2010) in their analysis of civil society
roles in poverty reduction distinguish three main roles per-
ceived of NGOs, which in the context of HIV/AIDS NGOs
appear like the following:
inject drugsR1 – round 1 of Global Fund (2003–2008)SR – sub-recipient
of GF fundingUNAIDS – Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDSUNDP
– United Nations Development ProgrammeVCT – voluntary counselling
and testingWHO – World Health Organization
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(1) Advocacy – defending the rights of people living with
HIV/AIDS, pushing for structural and system change,
better access for people in risk groups to medical
services;
(2) Policy change – lobbying changes in government laws
and regulations related to access to medical services,
anti-discrimination laws, etc.; and
(3) Service delivery – provision of basic services, includ-
ing provision of HIV prevention interventions.
Of these three roles, it is advocacy and service delivery
roles that often appear in juxtaposition when discussing the
context of NGO implementing aid programmes. In partic-
ular, the dual role of NGOs as implementers and civil society
advocates is widely discussed in the example of GF pro-
grammes. On the one side, Harmer et al. (2012) note that
an important outcome of the GF grants has been the in-
creased professionalisation of civil society organisations
(CSOs)2 through adopting adequate project management,
accounting, grant management, and other practices, which
has also been reported by Kapilashrami and O‘Brien (2012).
This is believed to have led to an increase in government
oﬃcials’ respect for CSOs, helped to build trust, and chal-
lenged government stereotypes of CSO organisational
capacity.
Donor publications in Ukraine expressed concerns over
the duality of NGOs roles as implementers and advocates,
mentioning posed risks to NGOs becoming less indepen-
dent, as they needed to engage with government during GF
programmes delivery. UNAIDS warned that “as organiza-
tions such as the Network focus on implementation of large
programmes and services as the PR for GF grants, they risk
undermining their role as effective and independent advo-
cates on behalf of civil society.” (UNAIDS, 2007, p. 31)
2.3. ‘NGOisation’ of HIV sector in Ukraine
Discussion about GF programmes in Ukraine would be
incomplete without recalling the broader context of aid pro-
grammes in EECA region where support for civil society was
seen by donors as “crucial to the post-communist politi-
cal transformation and a panacea for problems from
corruption and lack of accountability to service delivery
needs” (Lopes 2012, p. 1). While support to local NGOs was
a “talisman of international development organisations”
(Atlani-Duault, 2007, p. 14), support for civil society in the
post-communist world was particularly high on aid agen-
cies’ agenda. Henderson (2003) observed how Western
countries’ political agenda shifted after the fall of commu-
nism – after decades of promoting economic and social
development in the developing world, they moved to di-
rectly ‘promoting democracy’ in post-communist states. This
shift represented “a substantial foreign policy experi-
ment” (Henderson, 2003, p. 3). Aid programmes to post-
communist states were manifested by an inﬂux of
‘transnational advocates’ (Hrycak, 2007) – international
NGOs (INGOs) – and their funders. Increased contact with
‘transnational advocates’ often resulted in producing ‘ver-
tical organisations’ that were “more interested in pleasing
foreign donors, than paying attention to what people need
and what they say” (Fioramonti & Heinrich, 2007, p. 25),
“parroting the phrases donors expect in order to win grants”
(Hrycak, 2011, p. 261), and were often “more ﬁrmly rooted
in transnational networks than in their own societies”
(Wedel, 2001, p. 114).
In HIV/AIDS sector in Ukraine, external NGOs have played
a signiﬁcant role. The decisions to suspend R1 grant and to
appoint an INGO to implement its programme “were ulti-
mately the Global Fund’s decisions” (Drew &Malkin, 2005,
p. 3) that demonstrated a preference for external
organisations. In doing this, the GF appeared to follow a tra-
ditional aid approach, described by Carothers (1999) as an
‘external project’ method, in which an external organisation
runs all aspects of implementation work, uses external con-
sultants to assess the needs of the recipient country and
designs the projects to meet those needs. In Ukraine and
other former Soviet states, ‘external project’ approach was
predominant in aid programmes’ delivery. Zhukova (2013)
places a discussion of HIV/AIDS in Ukraine in context of
‘transnational governmentality’ and names the direction of
funding as a major determinant of the “NGOisation of the
HIV/AIDS sector in Ukraine” (Zhukova, 2013, p. 96).
Having been appointed a PR, International HIV/AIDS Al-
liance declared itself “the largest NGO in Ukraine. Its current
size stems primarily from the appointment […] of the UK-
based International HIV/AIDS Alliance as Principal Recipient
of the country’s Round 1 HIV/AIDS grant” (Alliance, 2009,
p. 35). The fact that an organisation posed as the largest na-
tional NGO merely because it was a subsidiary of a foreign
NGO and a recipient of GF funds bears important implica-
tions for the civil society dealing with HIV in Ukraine.
Concerns were voiced that GF preferences for “using well-
established international NGO rather than local organisations
has hindered opportunities to strengthen the latter’s ca-
pacity” (UNAIDS ASAP, 2009, p. 44).
Ukraine’s original GF country programme, designed to
deliver the services by state healthcare, faced serious chal-
lenges, when it was transferred to an INGO. With the MOH
as an implementer, the main bulk of services were to be de-
livered by state health-care workers, with NGOs assisting
in referral, as well as in care and support. With a transfer
of GF funding to an INGO, the perceived division of roles
between state health sector and NGOs ceased to exist. PR
needed to engage with healthcare sector, in order to im-
plement the programme. The system was adopted to
distribute GF funding to Sub-Recipients (SRs) – local NGOs
– that would then hire state health workers to work in
mobile clinics and other settings fully or partly operated by
NGOs (APMG, 2009). This paper focuses on the perceived
roles and relations that appeared in PR NGOs channelling
funding to SR NGOs in the regions during GF R1-R6 and the
impact that had on civil society working in HIV.
3. Methods
The author’s research was positioned within the broad
topic of aid effectiveness and examined how the GF aid de-
2 This paper uses the terms ‘civil society organisations‘ (CSOs) and ‘non-
governmental organisations‘ (NGOs) as they appear quoted in various
sources. Both terms are used interchangeably in context of Ukraine.
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livery model manifested itself on the ground in Ukraine.
Research aimed to question, following Easterly and
Williamson (n.d, p. 6) whether the GF performed the way
it said it would – as it is the “key question in the aid effec-
tiveness debate”. To study complex transnational processes
of aid organisations, the need was crucial to establish a ‘crit-
ical space’ that would allow a broader scope of views to be
reﬂected, including those that may not necessarily be pos-
itive accounts. In line with a signiﬁcant body of research of
aid programmes in post-communist countries represented
in works by Atlani-Duault (2007), Carothers (1999),
Owczarzak (2009), Wedel (2001) and others, a critical eth-
nographic enquiry was chosen as the research approach.
Taking into account the author’s familiarity and experi-
ence with aid programmes, the advantage of this approach
was seen, following Hammersley (1985, p. 152) in en-
abling the researcher “to document the culture – the
perspective and practices – of the people in these set-
tings”. The enquiry incorporated the views of a wide
spectrum of the study participants, many of whom partici-
pated in HIV service delivery, and integrated other evidence
leading to the ﬁndings, some of which are presented in this
paper. Primary data were collected in capital Kyiv and in
three regions of Ukraine through 50 in-depth, semi-
structured, face-to-face interviewswith purposively selected
participants with experience in GF programmes. Over-
whelmingmajority of the participants had ﬁve ormore years
of experience with GF programmes (see Figure 1):
Respondents were national and regional government
stakeholders, NGO heads and staff, and state health ser-
vices providers. Figure 2 illustrates the sector distribution
of respondents by their self-identiﬁcation:
An Interview Guide was developed that structured
enquiry into the following issues, among others:
- PR NGOs’ roles and relations with other actors in GF
programmes;
- Organisation of HIV prevention services (funding distri-
bution, choice of SRs, etc);
- Decision making practices of PRs in funding SR NGOs.
The interviews were transcribed verbatim, coded and
analysed using thematic content analysis. Analysis in-
cluded generation of matrix-based themes from the
interviews and theoretical coding in which open codes and
themes were compared to generate an analytic schema and
to interpret the ﬁndings.
Secondary data included published literature sources and
country documents on HIV prevention and GF programmes
in Ukraine. Analysis synthesised both ﬁndings from docu-
ment analysis and data emerging from interviews. Textual
evidence, including direct quotes from participants, was used
widely in writing. Regional or sector identities are not dis-
closed, and quotes are presented using the numbers to
protect participants’ anonymity.
4. Research scope and limitations
An evaluation of the entire scope of GF programmes in
Ukraine was outside the purview of this enquiry that crit-
ically examined the GF aid delivery model and its effects
on HIV prevention services during GF R1 and R6 grants
(2003–2012) as they were perceived ‘on the ground’ by GF
programme participants. No attempt was made of extrapo-
lating data from several regions to the whole country. By
analysing the roles, policies, relations and practices as they
are perceived by participants, the study points to certain
problematic consequences of GF programme implementa-
tion and seeks to raise more interest in the topic in the hope
4
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Fig. 1. Participants’ experience with GF programmes.
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of generating a systemic look into the whole impact of GF-
funded interventions on Ukraine’s national HIV/AIDS
response.
5. Results
In an early pledge formulated at the Genoa summit of
donors, the GF committed itself that “local partners, in-
cluding NGOs, … will be instrumental in the successful
operation of the Fund” (G8 Genoa, 2001), and since then
has articulated a strong focus on civil society organisations
to implement its programmes (GFATM, 2007). The GF 2004
decision to transfer implementation in Ukraine to an INGO
was deeply rooted in these beliefs.
As noted above, Ukraine’s original GF country pro-
gramme, geared at state health care system, faced serious
challenges, when it was transferred to an INGO. In Ukraine,
as in other post-Soviet states, the public sector was the only
one “to provide services needed to the fullest extent”
(UNAIDS, 2007, p. 39), and only state-licensed medics were
legally authorised to provide health services. With the gov-
ernment as a whole sidelined by the R1 transfer to an INGO,
as noted above, the need for PRs to engage with state health
care system in order to deliver the GF programme was
imminent.
Based on the data generated from interviews, GF’s focus
on NGOs to deliver its programmes had a fundamental
impact on channelling of GF funding, NGO relationships,
NGO decision making practices, both at the country level
and in the regions of Ukraine.
5.1. Channelling GF funding: divide and rule
As was mentioned before, to implement the pro-
gramme, the PR (Alliance) needed to develop a working
mechanism to engage with state healthcare. The decision
was found to channel GF funding to Sub-Recipients (SRs)
– local NGOs, which would then hire licensed health
workers from local state health institutions. PR chose two
ways to channel GF funds for HIV service delivery: (1) by
providing direct grants to NGOs and government depart-
ments by competitive tendering for new partners and
direct granting to existing partners; and (2) by indirect
granting (sub-grants) to local NGOs through other nation-
al NGO recipients. (Drew, 2005)
In R1, different granting procedures were applied to dif-
ferent NGO SRs: while new partners were issued grants
through a competitive tendering process, existing part-
ners and partners with ‘unique capacities’ were issued direct
contracts. Among concerns regarding the tendering process
were inadequate time for submission and perceptions of
some tenders as “tailored to speciﬁc organizations” (Drew,
2005, pp. 5–6).
In R6 of GF, distinctions and classiﬁcations between
different SRs became even more apparent. PR staff manual
on grant-making classiﬁed SRs according to the amounts
of GF funding received (below 50,000 Euros; between
50,000 and 300,000 Euros; and above 300,000 Euros) by
the scale of activities (local, national and intermediary)
and by status.
The ‘status’ classiﬁcation in particular reveals PRs’ high
degree of discretion. As outlined in Alliance manual, SRs
were divided into several categories, taking into account
whether they were new or existing partners of the Alliance
or whether they possessed a unique capacity to implement
HIV/AIDS programmatic activities in Ukraine. While the ﬁrst
two categories could receive money under an open call for
proposals, SRs with a unique capacity followed a closed call
for proposals and received GF funding as the only partici-
pant of such a closed call. Allowing some SRs to bypass the
competition suggests double standards. Criteria for being
classed as ‘unique’ appeared vague and included: “having
exclusive capacity and experience in implementing the sup-
ported programmatic activity, not possessed by other
organisations”; being “the only visible SR with an outstand-
ing record in the speciﬁc area of programmatic activity”;
or being “a favoured implementer of the speciﬁc program-
matic activities” (Alliance, 2007, p. 6), all of which suggest
a high level of PR discretion in making the selection.
Existence of the above classiﬁcations suggests that the
perceived strength of PR NGOs as having close links with
other NGOs in Ukraine did not appear in practice. Being put
in charge of GF funding allowed PRs to become arbiters in
moneymatters over other NGOs, and it had a profound effect
on the nature of the relationships between them as noted
in an R1 evaluation study: “where ﬁnancial relationships
exist, interactions may be ﬁnancially motivated or inter-
preted as such” (Drew, 2005, pp. 14–15). Another GF-
focused study in Ukraine suggested that, in distribution of
GF funding to SRs, “personal connections with Principal Re-
cipient staff are believed to increase the chance of receiving
a grant” (Semigina et al., 2008, p. 6).
When asked about experience with PRs, participants re-
ported grant procedures being diﬃcult and dependent on
personal connections:
Alliance has established priorities and pre-determined
organisations that will get funding. The grant competi-
tions are so diﬃcult that without special training it’s
impossible to even ﬁll in the application. As a result, only
‘known‘ NGOs can win. (012:454)
NGO heads began entering into closer relations with Al-
liance managers to achieve preferential treatment for their
NGOs. (046: 192–194)
In the context of the nascent civil society in Ukraine, the
power and control that PR NGOs gained from being in charge
of massive fundingwas a threat to the fragile local NGO part-
nerships. The lack of a uniﬁed approach to funding and
varied PR standards as applied to the SRs had important im-
plications for access to services in regions, sustainability of
services, as well as for relations between NGOs, and NGOs
relations with the state.
5.2. PRs NGOs and their perceived roles
5.2.1. Size matters: “big” PRs
The narratives of PRs NGOs in relation to their roles as
GF implementers had to do with them being ‘the largest’
NGOs in Ukraine. From 2004, the International HIV/AIDS Al-
liance in Ukraine continuously claimed to be “the largest
NGO in Ukraine” (Alliance, 2009, p. 35). In 2008, after be-
coming a PR of a R6 grant, the ‘Network’ similarly posed as
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“the most powerful HIV service organization in the country”
(Network 2008, p.11).
Similarly, participants referred to PR NGOs roles as ‘big’
(009: 76), ‘quite signiﬁcant’ (008: 35), and ‘key’ (002: 264).
PRs were also viewed as NGO ‘openers’ because they
“supported the creation of NGOs.” (007: 164–167).
5.2.2. PRs as donors/money distributors/rule-setters
Among the PR roles associated with GF money manage-
ment, participants reﬂected the following:
(a) Grant administrators, redistributing GF money:
[The PRs] are more like money distributors. (034:
132–133).
The Alliance is simply a funds-receiving and redistrib-
uting organisation – no more and no less. (026: 517–518);
The Alliance is more like a managerial structure… They
are a transmission mechanism for GF money to
implementers in country who have expertise and who can
conduct practical activities in the area of HIV. (001: 390–400)
(b) As donors. In this capacity, participants reﬂected that
an INGO (Alliance) often presented itself as owner of the
GF grant or even “as the GF itself” (013: 249):
In terms of publicity, you would often get the impres-
sion in the ﬁeld that this was the Alliance grant… and
Alliance was giving grants to sub-grantees. The Alliance logo
was always present everywhere […] This was the impres-
sion that the Alliance wanted to give, that it was an Alliance
thing. It really saw itself less as an organisation managing
the grant and more as a main contractor, which was giving
contracts as a donor. (049: 427–447)
(c) Rule-setters for the [GF] programmes:
The Alliance’s role as a Principal Recipient…it was very
much to set the rules. (049:320–321)
By setting standards, PRs had a power to determine
where the money will ﬂow:
[PRs] offered some standards and then, if the region ac-
cepted those standards and approved of their policies, the
money would come to that region. (030: 323–328).
The interview evidence resonates with document anal-
ysis, outlined above, that revealed similar concerns about
high PR discretion in awarding GF funding.
(d) PRs as policy enablers:
Because PRs were setting rules and policies, they were
also policy enablers as seen by participants. In this role, PRs
appeared to be inﬂuencing state policy. This ability was per-
ceived differently by participants, reﬂecting sector differences
among them. Participants from state sector were con-
cerned that PR NGOs acted as policy makers:
Unfortunately, AIDS state policy in Ukraine is created not
by the state, but by the GF recipients. (013:530)
The same person acts as the Alliance representative in
[…] region, and as head of the regional health depart-
ment. It’s a complete merger. (016: 156)
5.3. Evolving relations of PR NGOs with other NGOs: the
language of power and a “culture of fear”
Despite the declared NGO ‘partnership’, patterns of in-
equality began to appear after the GF R1 grant transfer,
manifesting a shift of inter-organisational relations (Drew,
2005). In these relations, the Alliance was seen acting ‘as
a donor’ with the ﬁnancial support going from the Alli-
ance to the [other NGO] organisations: “The possibility that
organizations might receive funds from the Alliance affect-
ed the nature of the relationship between the organizations”
(Drew, 2005, pp. 14–15).
Participants reﬂected on the changing nature of the re-
lationships between PR NGOs and other NGOs as GF
implementation progressed:
They [the Alliance] began saying in all the meetings that
they represented the entire NGO community of Ukraine. And
when somebody visited Ukraine, they did not invite anybody,
they just met with those people themselves. It gave the im-
pression that they were the only NGO in Ukraine. (047:
205–209)
Considerable money was thrown [around] to develop
the NGO potential in HIV/AIDS [sector] to assume leader-
ship position. Alliance’s own leadership potential was
quite high then. It assumed collegial relationships with
other NGOs, at least declaratively. They were quite com-
municable, open, and relations were built on two-way
communication. Somewhere around 2005, it began to
change. For us, local organisations, this appeared as the
dictatorship of the Alliance, in them asserting pressure on
organisations. Their monitoring visits – initially meant as
a mechanism to work out a common decision through
dialogue – began more to resemble inspections…with a
seemingly accusatory tone… but because the Alliance did
not oﬃcially announce its inspection policy in its rela-
tions with NGOs, it looked as an unspoken policy… there
appeared to be double standards in the Alliance’s work.
(045: 145–176)
In later GF Rounds, relations between PR NGOs and other
NGOs became strictly vertical and contract-based. Partici-
pants referred to PRs as ‘powerful and monopolies’:
Alliance [is] too powerful. (016: 129)
PRs have all the main management levers (041: 415),
“a monopoly and there is no alternative”. (016: 145–146)
PRs were also described as ‘bureaucratic machines’:
The Alliance and Network are by status charitable
organisations, but de facto they are almost like corpora-
tions… that are indeed in charge of bigmoney…and because
these GF procedures and all that GF bureaucracy are so im-
portant, they cannot, even if they wanted, to be anything
else but bureaucratic machines… (028: 380–385)
Or as ‘businesses’, and not an NGO:
The fact that they were so well-resourced and that they
have lots of highly educated professional people working
for them… gives them the impression of being less like a
traditional NGO and less of – at least in management prac-
tices – but someone who is very sleek and very business-
orientated, very good at PR. (049: 459–464)
‘Network’ was also seen as controlling:
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In the early days, they were possibly considered rather
inexperienced as amajor grantmanager, but lately, they have
been getting much more experience. It sounded like they
were starting to act a little more like the Alliance in terms
of having quite a lot of control over some aspects of the
grants – and over which NGOs would receive the funding
and what they would do… (049: 451–456)
As GF programmes proliferated, a growing dependen-
cy of SR NGOs on PRs became more visible. One country
report acknowledged “a widening rift between the power-
ful national organisations and smaller regional NGOs” (Druce,
Gittins, & Skotarenko, 2008, p. 10), while Spicer et al. (2011)
observed “a culture of fear derived from concerns for per-
sonal safety but also risk of losing donor largesse” among
the representatives of CSOs in Ukraine (Spicer et al., 2011,
p. 1751). Participants spoke on the evolution of relations
between the PR NGOs and SR NGOs in regions. PRs were
perceived as managers, exercising power and control, and
SR NGOs as passive recipients, accepting submissive roles:
The Principal Recipients were on the day-to-day man-
aging regardless of what other actors said or thought. Once
the proposal had been legitimised through the CCM, there
was little input from other actors. The two NGO Principal
recipients – theywere enormously powerful – and theywere
controlling and managing a vast sum of money. (049:
310–316)
Civil society cannot inﬂuence them [PRs] anymore.
They are way too powerful now to pay attention to the
outbursts of public discontent on behalf of civil society
organisations that are trying to challenge this or that
decision or direction of the Global Fund’s work. If some-
body wants to say that a Principal Recipient has done
somethingwrong, this has to be said not by one organisation,
and not even by a coalition of organisations, but by the
thousands of patients of this organisation. But because all
these patients are left dependant on the PR’s, and their
health and even life depend on whether PRs provide
treatment to AIDS centres, or to methadone sites, they
feel dependent in this situation and will never speak out.
(044:309–320)
Participants described PR–SR relations using terms such
as ‘obedient’, ‘conformist’, and ‘servile’ to describe SRs, while
a term ‘not collaborative’ described PRs:
The ﬁnal transformation – a switch towards total con-
formity from NGOs. In the second year [of R1], GF already
had potential and experience.We, the NGO community, were
the key experts in the ﬁeld; we needed to participate in
policy making, in research on HIV prevention, where our
expertise lay. But there were many NGO leaders who be-
lieved they were directly dependent on the Alliance – it
transformed into a director, not an implementer, as it orig-
inally was meant to be – equal to us partner. As a result,
the Alliance became experts on everything – on preven-
tion, on policy, and we – NGOs – became implementers. As
a result, Ukraine and the NGO community lost a powerful
collective capacity that was there before…We became re-
porting machines. Sooner or later, we would ask ourselves,
‘How did it happen that we grew a dragon among our-
selves?‘ We fell into an inferior position, and moved from
being leaders of the Third sector to servile implementers.
(046: 308–344)
Participants report that PR funding cycles had an effect
on organisations becoming submissive:
They [the Alliance] only have a one-year grant cycle. It
is not convenient. Because there is no predictability. You
never know if you are going to win a project next year or
not. Theoretically, you suppose that because you worked
well, you can receive another project. But you never know
for sure… This always brings in strain. (021: 160–164)
You cannot criticise the Alliance. It is hard to criticise the
principal recipients and continue receiving money. (028:
429–432)
5.4. Increased competition between local NGOs
Practices of PRs channelling GF funding, which were de-
scribed in previous sections, affected the way NGOs viewed
each other. Participants reported increasing competition and
a focus on winning the grant, not clients. There was no
uniﬁed view on competition. Few implementers thought of
a grant competition as ‘positive’:
The way the [GF] money is distributed in the regions, is
by organising grant competitions. If we talk about compe-
titions, the best alwayswins. So in this sense, the competitive
system is good, because it allows donors to ensure the nec-
essary quality of work. At the same time, if an NGO
understands that another NGO is breathing down its back,
it will improve the quality of work. And therefore compe-
tition is necessary… It keeps NGOs ‘toned‘, and it gives
donors the instruments needed to determine the quality of
NGO work and remove the NGOs that do not conform to
these criteria. (024: 119–134)
However, a large number of participants saw competi-
tion as negative because it impeded cooperation and made
NGOs compete with each other instead of ﬁnding more
clients.
It was a policy imposed by PRs. But we should not
compete among each other, but must work together. (017:
89–90)
6. Discussion
6.1. Servile NGO sector: implementers, not advocates
While the GF programmes’ value was acknowledged
by interviewees, perceptions varied of their outcomes on
civil society. As noted above, the decision to transfer
funding from a state-centred programme to an INGO was
GF’s decision. While in many other Eastern European
countries, for HIV NGOs, the need to secure funding oc-
curred “on the landscape of political and moral messages
regarding HIV and the need to serve their clients”
(Owczarzak, 2009, p. 422), Ukraine’s NGO context was
profoundly altered by the GF entry. Not only was there
little domestic discussion about the political and moral
messages important to HIV prevention, the fact that funding
was given directly to the INGO by the GF demonstrated
that this NGO did not emerge or develop from within civil
society in Ukraine. Nor was its recipient status a result of
a wide national initiative; rather it was a GF-appointed
advocate. GF selected an international NGO and its subsid-
iary, without a competition and for many years, as PR to
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run its programmes. Ukraine’s local NGOs, however, were
co-opted competitively through PR-controlled grant con-
tracts and were used opportunistically to deliver services
and generate coverage data.
Theoutcomesof theGFdecision to transfer a government-
focused grant to an INGOdisadvantagedUkraine’s emerging
civil society dealing with HIV/AIDS. The observed results in
Ukraine are consistentwith the critiques of Sampson (2003)
and Hrycak (2007) that ‘external projects’ sideline bona ﬁde
grass roots organisations and implant ‘transnational advo-
cates’ – INGOs with pre-set external agendas. Based on the
available evidence, an unanticipated outcome of the GF pro-
gramme transfer to an INGOand its linkingorganisationswas
to impair the advocacy potential of Ukraine’s ‘Third sector’.
This GF decision, as predicted by UNAIDS, hindered oppor-
tunities to strengthen the local organisations advocacy
capacity. Analysis of primary and secondary data conﬁrmed
weakeningof theNGOsector inUkraine after theGFR1 trans-
fer to an INGO,manifested in both PRs positioning as ‘largest
NGOs in Ukraine’ and in their ultimate assertion in the role
of donors in distributing GF funding. The ‘donor-like’ role of
PRs, ﬁrst observed in R1, led to “a shift of inter-organisational
relations” (Drew, 2005). In R6, dependency of local NGOs on
PRs deepened.
As shown above, Ukrainian civil society sector was co-
opted through competitive and PR-controlled channelling of
funds, producing a servile NGO community. PRNGOs, acting
as donors, ran highly discretionary policies of Sub-Recipient
funding, by which they classiﬁed SR NGOs as possessing “a
unique capacity” or “exclusive capacity and experience”, as “fa-
voured implementers” and so on (Alliance, 2007, p. 6). The use
of ‘established’ NGOs appears to be consistentwith the need
to spend money quickly – a ‘short-termism‘ approach –
characterised “by the need for urgency and meeting chal-
lengingdeadlines”, and “a constant tensionbetween following
procedures correctly andgetting things doneon time” (Drew,
2005, p. 11). Participants reported that localNGOswere forced
to compete with each other and turned into passive recipi-
ents of GF sub-grants, with a limited ability to advocate for
issues beyond the scope of GF programmes. Local NGOs,
instead of looking out to better serve their constituencies,
had to endure a permanent competition among themselves
for “donor largesse” (Spicer et al., 2011, p. 1751), and suc-
cumbed to vertical, contract-based relations established
between NGO-grantors and NGO-grantees, with a wide-
spread “culture of fear” (p. 1751) about future funding.With
GF the largest HIV funder in most regions, the only alterna-
tive for regional NGOs was ‘get a GF grant or perish’.
This contradicts the initial GF assumption that PR NGOs
would be capitalizing on the existing NGO networks. Instead,
regional grass roots NGOs lost the voice to articulate where
the real needs lay, and turned, in the words of one partic-
ipant, “from being leaders of the Third sector into servile
implementers”. Advocating for broader policy issues or for
re-programming GF funding tomeet the actual needs in their
regions would have threatened their own funding. Lack of
broader civil society engagement with government com-
promises its capacity to advocate scaling up future domestic
HIV funding in case of donor exit. The task of protecting the
rights of communities vulnerable to HIV won’t be easy for
the weakened ‘Third sector’ in Ukraine.
7. Conclusion
The GF focus on NGOs to deliver its programmes had
clashed with some pre-existing conditions of civil society
in Ukraine, already affected by externally-funded NGO pro-
motion and ‘NGOisation’ of its HIV/AIDS sector. These pre-
conditions were further exacerbated after the GF R1 grant
transfer. By selecting an INGO and its subsidiary as PRs to
run its programmes for many years and without competi-
tion, GF demonstrated a preference for external
organisations. Ukraine’s own NGOs, however, were co-
opted competitively through PR-controlled channelling of
GF funds to Sub-Recipients that were used opportunisti-
cally to deliver services.
While the ﬁndings of the study may challenge initial GF
assumptions about the strength of existing NGO partner-
ships as key to its programmes success in Ukraine, they
support the existing views on external NGOs acting as donors
to other civil society actors in recipient countries. The de-
livery of GF programmes brought in and institutionalised
multiple divisions among NGOs that had adverse effects on
relations of civil society with the state. In context of de-
mocracy, the race for grants enabled bymassive channelling
of GF funding had a detrimental effect and corrupted
Ukraine’s nascent HIV/AIDS civil society. Funds channel-
ling by two PR NGOs was often based on double standards
and not perceived as fair by study participants. The ability
of NGOs to advocate for issues broader than GF programme
delivery was severely impaired.
A persistent GF focus on NGOs delivering HIV services
had an adverse effect on Ukraine’s ownership of HIV pre-
vention and threatens its sustainability. For years, HIV/
AIDS programmes in many EECA countries, including
Ukraine, have been heavily, or exclusively, reliant on GF
funding. With an anticipated GF phasing out of EECA region,
and transition of HIV programmes into state funding, the
risks are high that the NGO-run services currently funded
by GF will not be funded by the state (McGill, 2014). A GF
exit from Ukraine would come at the worst possible time.
The country is in dire economic straits and racked by mil-
itary conﬂict in the East. Funding for HIV prevention and
treatment would compete with modernizing the military
and maintaining public electricity and heating systems. Ac-
cording to some estimates, national HIV prevention budget
in Ukraine was already slashed by 71 percent in 2014 amid
political and economic upheaval (Stracansky, 2014).
While the GF exit may render many of the previously
funded NGOs as non-existent, lack of a strong civil society
to advocate the needs of PLHIV will be especially alarm-
ing as current crisis continues and HIV vulnerabilities
increase. Ironically, for Ukraine, if little state funding is avail-
able for HIV, donor community would need tomobilisemore
funding and INGOsmay need to be brought in again to assist
the country’s ailing populations in its humanitarian crisis.
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